Pakistan's Objectives in Afghanistan
18/09/2025
By K N Pandita and Fatima Baloch
The creation of Pakistan in 1947 was deeply influenced by the British colonial strategy of "divide and rule." Rather than emerging from a purely organic nationalist movement, Pakistan was born out of the partition of British India under the pretext of religion—specifically, the "Two-Nation Theory." This division not only fractured the Indian subcontinent but also weakened Muslim political cohesion. The geopolitical repercussions of Pakistan's formation extended beyond its borders, profoundly affecting neighbouring Afghanistan.
The foundation of the Two-Nation Theory was later discredited when Pakistan disintegrated in 1971 and Bangladesh emerged as an independent state, casting doubt on the legitimacy of that ideological construct. One of the most contentious outcomes of Pakistan's creation was the inclusion of Pashtun-majority regions along the Durand Line—a colonial-era border agreement signed in 1893 between British India and Afghanistan. Afghanistan never recognized this artificial boundary, viewing it as a temporary and unjust demarcation that arbitrarily divided Afghan and Pashtun ethnic populations between the two nations.
As a result, Afghanistan became the first country to refuse recognition of Pakistan at the United Nations. Afghan leaders feared that the partition, coupled with the Durand Line, would marginalise Pashtuns and undermine Afghan sovereignty over historically connected territories.
For Pakistan, a strong, independent, and nationalist Afghanistan posed a strategic threat. Islamabad feared that such a government could reignite Pashtun nationalism—calling for an independent Pashtunistan or a merger with Afghanistan—challenge the legitimacy of the Durand Line, and potentially support Baloch separatism. This would threaten Pakistan's territorial integrity both from the west (Pashtunistan) and the south (Baluchistan).
In response, Pakistan adopted a long-standing policy of interference in Afghanistan's internal affairs, exploiting nearly every phase of the country's political instability. With backing from the United States, Saudi Arabia, and other Western allies during the Cold War, Pakistan played a central role in undermining successive Afghan governments.
In the 1970s, Pakistan supported opposition groups against King Zahir Shah and later against President Daud Khan. It continued to meddle in Afghanistan's internal politics, backing warring factions that brought destruction to Afghan society. During the Soviet intervention (1979–1989), Pakistan served as a key conduit for U.S. and Saudi funding to the Mujahideen fighters.
After the fall of the communist regime in 1992, Pakistan supported specific Mujahideen factions—particularly Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's—contributing to a full-scale civil war that devastated a once well-developed Afghanistan.
In 1996, Pakistan backed the rise of the Taliban, who eventually seized control of most of Afghanistan, replacing Hekmatyar, the erstwhile protege of Islamabad. During this period, Pakistan not only influenced political outcomes but also sought to reshape Pashtun identity—transforming many secular, moderate, and nationalist anti-Pakistan elements into more religiously radicalised, pro-Pakistan forces. This served Islamabad's strategic goals.
These interventions came at a devastating cost. Decades of war, foreign meddling, and civil strife destroyed Afghanistan's infrastructure, displaced millions, and left deep psychological scars across generations. This history of manipulation fostered deep anger and resentment among Afghans toward Pakistan. Pakistan's "strategic depth" doctrine—the idea of using influence over Afghan territory to secure its western flank—ensured that Afghanistan remained militarily weak, politically unstable, and dependent.
Today, many Afghans do not see Pakistan as a friendly neighbour but rather as a long-time manipulator of their national destiny. The repeated denial of Afghanistan's sovereignty and identity has fueled enduring resentment, distrust, and hostility.
However, following the Taliban's return to power on August 15, 2021, Pakistan has been facing unexpected consequences—what some interpret as political karma. The emergence of a strong, religiously grounded, and nationally assertive Afghan Taliban government, coupled with the resurgence of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), has introduced new security challenges for Islamabad. As a result, Pakistan is engaged in a dangerous conflict in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), with the military suffering significant casualties since the Afghan Taliban's takeover of Kabul.
In light of this grave situation, former U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad has warned that continued violence between Pakistani security forces and the TTP has led to heavy losses, and that Islamabad is mistaken in believing a military solution is viable. "The Pakistani establishment always advised the U.S. and Afghan governments before 2021 to negotiate and seek a political settlement with the Afghan Taliban. The time has come for Pakistan to consider doing the same," he said.
His remarks suggest a grim prediction: that the Pakistan Army may face a fate similar to that of the Ashraf Ghani-led Afghan forces—defeat and eventual dissolution.
In response, Pakistan has sought support from China, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia to pressure the Afghan Taliban into acting against the TTP, BLA, and other Baloch nationalist groups. Reports also suggest that Pakistan is once again engaging with anti-Taliban factions such as Hekmatyar and remnants of the Northern Alliance, in an attempt to destabilize the current Taliban-led government—reviving strategies reminiscent of the 1980s and 1990s. Pakistani military officials have also made repeated threats of airstrikes in Kabul in retaliation for TTP-led attacks inside Pakistan.
Moreover, Pakistan continues to conduct airstrikes inside Afghanistan—actions that only deepen resentment among ordinary Afghans and push the Taliban-led government toward aligning with India. Likely, India will soon recognize the Taliban government, following in the footsteps of the Russian Federation.
It is crucial to note that, despite ideological affinities, the TTP fought alongside the Afghan Taliban during their 20-year-long insurgency against the U.S. and NATO. During that period, Pakistan remained a key U.S. ally in that war. This historical contradiction now complicates Pakistan's efforts to pit the Afghan Taliban against the TTP. Such moves risk internal divisions within the Taliban—divisions that Pakistan may again attempt to exploit to reassert its influence.
In contrast, India has largely focused on developmental support in Afghanistan, contributing to education, healthcare, and infrastructure while refraining from interfering in Afghan domestic politics.
Conclusion
The Afghan Taliban must resist Pakistani pressure to act against the TTP and Baloch freedom fighters on Islamabad's behalf. Such actions could alienate their own supporters and reignite factionalism within the Taliban. Instead, the Taliban should prioritize rebuilding the country by improving governance, education, healthcare, and infrastructure for the benefit of ordinary Afghans.
Furthermore, the Taliban must remain vigilant against possible Pakistani efforts to destabilize their government through proxy groups. In response, some argue that the Taliban should leverage relationships with the TTP and BLA to push back against Pakistani pressure.
Additionally, strengthening regional partnerships, including India, could help balance Pakistan's influence and reinforce Afghanistan's sovereignty. Just as Russia has recognized the Taliban government, India might also consider doing so to deepen its historical ties with the Afghan people and expand cooperation in education, health, and development—ultimately promoting long-term peace and regional stability.
(Dr K N Pandita is the former Director of the Central Asian Studies, Kashmir and Fatima Bloch is a research scholar)
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