Pakistan’s Misunderstanding of TTP, BLA, and TTA
01/10/2025
By Fatima Baloch
Pakistani “regional experts” and self-styled analysts are no strangers to deception. Many have engaged in propaganda that misleads the public and contributes to failures in diplomacy and warfare. In particular, Pakistan’s Afghan policy suffers from poor leadership, flawed strategic thinking, and a lack of credibility on international platforms. Three persistent narratives have recently gained traction:
1. Pakistan is pressuring the Afghan Taliban—via China, Turkey, Qatar, and others—to take action against the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA).
2. The Supreme Leader of the Afghan Taliban has issued a fatwa declaring jihad against Pakistan a sin, discouraging Afghan or TTP fighters from engaging in conflict.
3. The Afghan Taliban are relocating 50,000 TTP families to western Afghanistan to prevent them from waging jihad against Pakistan.
Revisiting the Past
To understand the present, one must revisit history. After the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan aligned itself with the United States and NATO in the war in Afghanistan, positioning itself as a “frontline ally.” In return, it received billions in military and economic aid. But this alliance came at a devastating cost—millions of Pakistani Pashtuns and Afghans were killed or displaced during the 20-year conflict.
Even General Musharraf admitted in his book In the Line of Fire that the Pakistan Army handed over Afghans and Pashtuns to U.S. military detention centers, often without due process. Subsequent democratic governments continued this policy. The TTP emerged in 2007 during this era, as Pakistan’s military fought alongside NATO forces. Balochistan endured ongoing violence, and countless innocent lives were lost. Throughout the U.S. occupation, the TTP remained ideologically aligned with the Afghan Taliban, sharing cultural and religious values. Thousands of their fighters were martyred in the fight against foreign forces.
The Illusion of External Pressure
Many in Pakistan believe that countries like China, Turkey, or Qatar will pressure the Afghan Taliban to act against the TTP and BLA. But if the Taliban resisted two decades of U.S. and NATO military pressure, why would they now yield to Pakistan’s demands? History shows that the Afghan nation does not bow to superpowers—least of all to Pakistan’s coercion.
The TTP and Afghan Taliban are ideological allies. Pakistan, having contributed to Afghanistan’s instability for decades, cannot expect cooperation from a group it once undermined. The Taliban leadership understands that siding with Pakistan against the TTP would provoke resentment among Afghans and risk internal fractures—potentially leading to another civil war.
The Misinterpreted Fatwa
The fatwa allegedly issued by the Taliban’s Supreme Leader is widely misunderstood. The TTP are not outsiders—they speak Pashto, share familial ties with the Afghan Taliban, and have fought alongside them against foreign occupation. Both groups reject the Durand Line and consider Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (up to Attock) part of historical Afghanistan.
The fatwa in question was issued three years ago and does not specifically mention Pakistan. Nevertheless, Pakistan’s Foreign Office and ISPR continue to accuse the Afghan Taliban of supporting the TTP, citing evidence of Afghan nationals participating in attacks on Pakistani military installations. Despite these claims, the fatwa has had no practical impact in Pakistan’s favor. Misinterpreting its intent and context only deepens strategic confusion.
In reality, the fatwa was intended to discourage Afghan nationalists from waging war against neighboring countries such as Iran, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and others—both Islamic and non-Islamic. Historically, Afghan religious fighters participated in global jihad movements, often beyond their borders. The fatwa aimed to curb this trend and promote regional stability.
However, Pakistan presents a unique case. It is neither a truly Islamic nor democratic republic and has long been a close ally of the United States and Western powers—those who waged a 20-year war against Afghanistan. From the Afghan Taliban’s perspective, Pakistan’s role in that conflict places it outside the scope of protection envisioned by the fatwa.
On the Relocation of TTP Families
Claims that the Afghan Taliban are relocating 50,000 TTP families to western Afghanistan must be viewed in historical context. During the 1980s, millions of Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan during the Soviet war. That migration did not end the conflict.
Is the Taliban now expected to house and support 50,000 TTP families despite Afghanistan’s dire economic conditions? Or is this relocation a strategic move, possibly with Pakistan’s tacit approval? It is unrealistic to believe that the TTP—after two decades of resistance—would simply abandon their cause, especially given their shared history with the Afghan Taliban.
History Repeating Itself
This is a case of karma. The Afghan Taliban are now doing to Pakistan what Pakistan did to Afghanistan during the Karzai and Ghani eras. Since the 1980s, Pakistan’s interference in Afghan affairs—particularly its support for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar—fueled civil war and destruction. This legacy has bred deep mistrust among Afghans.
Nationalist figures within the Afghan Taliban reportedly maintain cordial relations with Baloch freedom fighters. The Baloch are part of Afghanistan’s ethnic mosaic, with Nimroz being a Baloch-majority province that remained peaceful during the Soviet intervention (1978–89), Afghan civil war (1990–96), and the U.S./NATO occupation (2001–2021). Afghan Baloch leadership consistently negotiated with Herat’s prominent Islamist commander Ismail to avoid internal conflict and resolve state matters amicably. As a result, civil war was avoided in August 2021 during the U.S. withdrawal.
Today, Afghan Baloch hold key positions in the Taliban’s political and military structures. Some are said to support Baloch nationalists seeking independence. Pakistan’s past interference has contributed to the serious security challenges it now faces. On the other hand, historically, Baloch migrants and BLA freedom fighters from Pakistan-occupied Balochistan have remained neutral in Afghan politics and internal conflicts, earning respect and solidarity.
Meanwhile, India—following Russia’s lead—may consider recognizing the Afghan Taliban government. India has historically supported Afghanistan through development and humanitarian aid, avoiding political manipulation. Any recognition would further complicate Pakistan’s strategic calculus.
Conclusion and Lessons for the Afghan Taliban and India
Pakistan is exhausted by its prolonged guerrilla war against the TTP and BLA. In an attempt to attract global attention and shift the narrative, Pakistan may escalate tensions by launching direct military action against Afghanistan—provoking conflict with the Afghan Taliban and seeking international intervention to dismantle both the TTP and Baloch nationalist movements. It may also provoke hostilities with India to gain sympathy from religious militant groups, portraying itself as a defender of Kashmiri Muslims and framing the TTP’s insurgency as a misguided jihad.
The Afghan Taliban must avoid engaging in conflict with the TTP and Baloch nationalists on Pakistan’s behalf. Doing so risks internal discord, political instability, and economic deterioration—conditions Pakistan could exploit to destabilize Afghanistan further.
India and the Afghan Taliban should collaborate in education, healthcare, and industrial development to create job opportunities and rebuild Afghanistan. India should formally recognize the Afghan Taliban government, as Russia has done, and enhance diplomatic and strategic relations.
Pakistan’s media and analysts, by clinging to false narratives, continue to harm their own nation. These misconceptions have led to cascading crises—from tensions with India and unrest in Balochistan to nationalist uprisings in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and full-scale conflict with the TTP, marked by airstrikes and drone warfare.
Misunderstanding the ideological alignment between the Afghan Taliban and the TTP—or relying on external powers to reshape these relationships—is a dangerously flawed strategy. Pakistan must confront its historical role in the region and accept the consequences now unfolding.
Indian policymakers must recognize the potential collapse of Pakistan’s military structure, reminiscent of the fall of Ashraf Ghani’s forces. Pakistan has already lost effective control over Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. If the TTP gains further ground, they may impose strict Sharia law, curtailing female education, free speech, and human rights—and potentially initiate hostilities against India under various pretexts.
India must act decisively to protect moderate Shia Zaidi Muslims in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which remains a union territory of India. If the TTP nears Islamabad and the Pakistan Army faces defeat at the hands of TTP and Baloch nationalists, India must be prepared to assert full control over the entire region of POK. The strategic framework and operational details have been outlined in previous articles and are publicly accessible online.
(Fatima Bloch is a research scholar)
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