Indian and Afghan Unity for Balochistan
16/10/2025
By Fatima Baloch
Pakistan has launched a full-fledged war against its western neighbor, Afghanistan. While temporary ceasefires may occur under pressure from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, this conflict is likely to persist until Pakistan collapses. Historically, Afghanistan has resisted foreign domination. In 1979, the USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) intervened militarily, toppling President Mohammad Daud Khan and installing a communist regime under Babrak Karmal. In response, Afghan mujahideen—backed by the United States, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states—waged a decade-long proxy war that led to the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.
After the Soviet retreat, Pakistan supported warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, whose rivalry with other mujahideen commanders triggered a brutal civil war in 1992. As former allies turned on each other, Afghanistan descended into chaos. In this vacuum, the Taliban—largely composed of madrassa students backed by Pakistan’s military—emerged in 1994. They eventually defeated Hekmatyar and seized control, establishing a regime that served Pakistan’s strategic interests by providing “strategic depth” against India.
Emboldened by its perceived success in Afghanistan, Pakistan adopted similar proxy tactics in Kashmir. Islamabad supported, trained, and funded militant groups—most notably Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), led by Masood Azhar, and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), led by Hafiz Saeed—fueling an insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir. Before the Soviet invasion, Kashmir was known for its natural beauty and international tourism.
India initially responded to cross-border militancy with strategic restraint, focusing on counter-insurgency and diplomacy. However, major attacks—such as the Uri assault in 2016, the Pulwama bombing in 2019, and subsequent incidents in Pahalgam—forced a shift in India’s posture. In May 2025, India launched Operation Sindoor, a targeted military campaign to dismantle terror networks responsible for mass civilian casualties. Though briefly paused, India warned that any future attack would trigger Operation Sindoor 2.0—an even more forceful response against the Pakistan Army, now an active participant in the conflict.
Since then, there have been no attacks on the Indian Army in Kashmir. India has resumed large-scale counter-terror operations, while Pakistan has refrained from openly supporting Kashmiri and Punjabi militants due to fear of Operation Sindoor’s resumption. As a result, parts of Kashmir have returned to relative normalcy. Meanwhile, Pakistan faces escalating internal crises in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), along with deteriorating relations with Afghanistan.
Despite possessing a large nuclear arsenal, Pakistan is grappling with a deepening security crisis. The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatist groups like the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) continue high-intensity insurgencies. Frustrated by its inability to suppress these movements, Pakistan has launched fighter jet and drone strikes into Afghanistan—violating Afghan sovereignty—and opened a full-scale western front. Yet, TTP and BLA fighters continue to operate inside Pakistan. These strikes appear aimed at pressuring Kabul to dismantle anti-Pakistan insurgent networks.
Pakistan’s failure to manage asymmetric warfare has led to desperation. It now seeks to internationalize its internal conflicts, hoping regional powers such as China, Qatar, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States will pressure Kabul to act against groups sheltering along the Afghan border. After 9/11, Pakistan allied with the U.S. and NATO-led war on terror in Afghanistan, receiving Non-NATO ally status and substantial aid. During this period, the TTP emerged and aligned ideologically with the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s repeated interference in Afghan affairs has fueled nationalist and anti-Pakistan sentiment among Afghans and the Taliban 2.0. Today, Afghanistan views a TTP-controlled Pakistan as a potential source of long-term peace and security—envisioning both countries as sharia-based Islamic allies. Thus, Afghanistan is unlikely to abandon the TTP.
Pakistan has made it clear that unless the TTP is dismantled—or unless the Afghan Taliban acts against the TTP and BLA—cross-border pressure will persist. Islamabad likely hopes for either a diplomatic resolution or direct Taliban action. Simultaneously, it appears to be preparing for potential escalation with India in areas such as Sir Creek and other border sectors. There is growing concern that the TTP could expand its territorial control within Pakistan, echoing the Taliban’s rapid takeover of Afghanistan in August 2021. A scenario in which militant groups control significant territory in a nuclear-armed state would be profoundly destabilizing.
This Afghan–Pakistan conflict was predicted in the October 2025 article “Pakistan’s War Option and India’s Strategic Response.”
Here’s a corrected and polished version of your original conclusion. I’ve refined the grammar, improved clarity, and maintained the original intent and tone:
Conclusion
Pakistan’s military campaign in Afghanistan is aimed at pressuring the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) into submission. However, Afghanistan has a long history of resisting external influence—from the Soviet Union to the United States and NATO—and is unlikely to comply with Pakistani demands. The TTP and BLA insurgencies are expected to persist, with continued attacks on Pakistani military installations and ambushes. In response, Islamabad may escalate its operations deeper into Afghan territory.
There is also a growing possibility that Pakistan will provoke a confrontation with India—either to rally domestic support, divert attention from internal instability, or internationalize the conflict by appealing to the United Nations and other global powers for protection against the TTP, BLA, and Afghan Taliban (TTA).
In this context, India and Afghanistan must strengthen their cooperation. This includes sharing weapons and air defense systems, and jointly confronting Pakistan’s military in the east through Operation Sindoor 2.0. India should formally recognize the Afghan Taliban, as Russia has done, and deepen coordination with Kabul. New Delhi must also engage with secular Baloch nationalists—particularly the BLA leadership—and support the establishment of a free and independent secular Balochistan. This would enhance long-term security for both India and Afghanistan.
India should prepare contingency plans, including a calibrated expansion of Operation Sindoor 2.0—not only to safeguard its national interests but also to reclaim Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) before a potential collapse of the Pakistani state. If extremist groups like the TTP gain control of a nuclear-armed Pakistan, the threat would become significantly more dangerous and unpredictable. Managing a radical neighbor with a jihadist ideology would pose a far greater challenge.
(The author is a Baloch scholar and researcher in a foreign country)
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